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The Use of Performance Information 




E. Pieter Jansen1 
 
 






New Public Management (NPM) is the commonly used label for the growing popularity of 
businesslike control tools in governmental organisations. NPM includes several dimensions of 
change, such as divisionalisation, visible and active control and a prominent role for performance 
measurement. Developments in Dutch local government demonstrate several of these elements 
of NPM. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) and Pollitt (2002) defined four “levels” of NPM change: 
(1) “discourse”; (2) “decisions”; (3) “practices” and (4) “results”. 
 
This paper focuses on performance measurement. The politicians and managers at the top of the 
investigated municipalities took the decision to adopt instruments that generate performance 
information. This paper seeks to explain the extent to which the information resulting from these 
instruments is actually being used in the management practices at work floor level. It investigates 
two categories of explanations for information use: characteristics of the available information 
(such as its contents, amount and quality) and characteristics of the organization and its routines. 
The paper thus analyses how “decisions” taken by politicians and top managers to adopt NPM 
relate “practices” at work floor level. 
 
                                                           
1 I am indebted to Henk J. ter Bogt, G. Jan van Helden, Jeltje van der Meer–Kooistra 





Since the 1980s, the application of businesslike control tools in governmental 
organisations has been a topic in the spotlight of both practitioners and academics. New 
Public Management (NPM) is the commonly used label for these major transitions in 
controlling governmental organisations (Hood 1995). In defining NPM Hood (1995) 
indentifies seven dimensions of change. First, he identifies a shift towards greater 
disaggregation of public organisations into separately managed units. Usually, the 
newly formed divisions are cost centres organised per product or product group. 
Second, greater competition is introduced, both between public sector organisations and 
with the private sector. Third, the public sector moves to management practices with 
proven value in the private sector. Fourth, NPM implies a greater stress on cost 
efficiency and discipline. Fifth, management becomes more hands-on, i.e. more visible 
and active control and clearer responsibilities. Sixth, performance measurement plays a 
much more explicit role: measurable standards are set and play an important role in 
evaluating the functioning of the organisation. Seventh and finally, governmental 
organisations under the influence of NPM become more result-oriented and use output 
measures. 
Developments in Dutch local government demonstrate several elements of NPM as 
described above. During the 1980s and 1990s the organisation structures of most large 
Dutch municipalities have been reorganised drastically. Divisionalisation, which is the 
first dimension of NPM as identified by Hood, is generally adopted by Dutch 
municipalities (Schrijvers 1988; Van Helden 1992; Ter Bogt/Van Helden 1992). 
Divisionalisation implies the devolution of tasks within an organisation (to departments 
or divisions) without diminishing the constitutional responsibility of the city council 
(Ter Bogt 1995: 84; Ter Bogt 1994; Schreuder 1991: 223). 
Until the beginning of the 1980s, the organisation structures of Dutch 
municipalities were very centralised and hierarchical. The city manager was the central 
public servant in the organisation. The formulation of policy was located at the central 
level in the organisation under the city manager’s direct authority. The implementation 
of the policy thus formulated took place in the several departments of the municipal 
organisation, but again under the authority of the city manager. Consequently, there was 
a partial separation between the formulation and the implementation of policy: the city 
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manager was directly involved in policy formulation; although he was formally 
responsible, he usually did not directly interfere with implementation. 
In the new organisation model the influence of the separate departments or 
divisions of the municipal organisation is comparatively large, at the expense of the 
position of the city manager and his staff. City managers used to be dominant in policy 
formulation, but have now become coordinators between different policy fields and 
between politicians and civil servants. Formulation and implementation of policy in 
specific fields are integrated and mainly take part in the separate departments. The 
departments assist the Mayor and Aldermen in formulating policy goals in their specific 
fields. The responsibility for managing finances, personnel and, most importantly, for 
production processes has moved to a large extent from the central to the divisional 
management. Municipal social services departments, for instance, advise the Municipal 
Executive on issues and policy concerning their specific specialisation, produce the 
products as agreed and largely manage their own finances and internal organisation. In 
the previous organisation model, the city manager and his staff had a much more central 
position in formulating policy and managing the organisation and its production 
processes (Schrijvers 1988; Ter Bogt/Van Helden 1992; Van Helden 1997; Schrijvers 
1993).  
Contract management is a characteristic phenomenon in the new divisional 
municipal organisation structure. It is a crucial concept in both the internal 
decentralisation of tasks, and management control. The so-called management contract 
is one of the two most important elements in contract management. The management 
contract specifies the throughput to be performed and the output to be realised by a 
particular division within a certain time span. The inputs available in order to generate 
the contracted output are also defined in the management contract. A management 
contract is thus a written agreement between the management of a division on the one 
hand, and the central management and the Municipal Executive on the other, concerning 
the performance to be generated by the division involved.  
The other important and characteristic element in contract management is the so-
called management report. A management report addresses questions concerning the 
extent to which the performance specified in the management contract has actually been 
achieved. In this document, divisional managers account for their output and for 
discrepancies between the realised output and the previously set targets. Often, 
management reports also involve the accounting for the realised outputs in relation to 
the consumed inputs. Together, the management contracts and the management reports 
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are essential to enable the central management and the Municipal Executive to control 
the divisions. Management contracts describe the targets of the divisions and the means 
to reach these targets. The extent to which the divisions realise the targets at the end of a 
specific period is described in management reports (Van der Krogt/Spijker 1989; 
Haselbekke et al. 1990: 36-37; Van Helden 1992; for an evaluation of contract 
management see Korsten 1996). The concept of contract management incorporates 
several elements of NPM: a focus on output, visible control, clearer responsibilities and 
performance measurement. All in all, performance information is essential in the newly 
developed concept of contract management. Management reports, which form an 
essential link in the management control process of divisionalized governmental 
organisations, consist mainly of performance information. This information aims at 
accounting for the achievement of the targets set in management contracts.  
 
 
2. Conceptual model and research questions 
 
Pollitt (2002) distinguishes four levels of change related to NPM. These four levels 
range from abstract to specific. Discourse, the first and most abstract level, incorporates 
the ideas of running the public sector in a more businesslike manner, ideas usually 
owned by the politicians at the top of the organization. Decisions, usually taken by top 
managers, constitute the second, more specific level of NPM. These decisions, based on 
the discourse of NPM, relate to the actual development and implementation of 
businesslike instruments. Examples of such instruments are systems for performance 
measurement and systems for the calculation of unit costs. Management practices, the 
third level, are the actions by work floor management; it relates to the extent to which 
the newly implemented businesslike instruments are actually embedded in daily 
management practices and styles. The role of management information, resulting from 
the new management instruments indicates whether or not this third dimension of 
change has been realized. Results, i.e. the effects of the changes for the organization’s 
citizens or customers, constitute the fourth level of change. 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) and Pollitt (2002) conceptualize public sector reforms 
in a manner that implies a hierarchy ranging from the abstract level of discourse to more 
specific decisions and practices. However, Burns and Scapens (2000) adopted an 
approach in which they explicitly stress that “rules” (comparable with “decisions”, 
Pollitt 2002) and “routines” (Pollitt 2002: “practices”) are mutually, and not 
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hierarchically, related. Burns and Scapens (2000) used an institutional framework to 
conceptualise management accounting change. In their framework, they use four 
concepts: rules, routines, institutions and actions. Rules are the formalized statements of 
procedures, whereas routines are the procedures actually in use. In the context of 
management accounting, rules comprise the formal management accounting systems, as 
they are set out in the procedure manuals, whereas routines are the accounting practices 
actually in use (Burns / Scapens 2000: 7). Institutions are the structural properties which 
comprise the taken-for-granted assumptions about the way of doing things, which shape 
and constrain the rules and routines, and determine the meanings, values and also 
powers of the individual actors. Rules, routines, institutions and actions are in a 
continuous process of change. However, new rules and routines may also be introduced 
in a more discrete way.  
NPM in general and, more specifically, the changes in Dutch local government as 
described in section 1 of this paper are usually introduced in a discrete way, initiated by 
politicians at the top level of the organization. Initiation of NPM seems to follow the 
hierarchical line of reasoning as set by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) and Pollitt (2002). 
The widespread adoption of divisionalised organization structures and the dispersion of 
the concept of contract management indicate that Dutch municipalities have been 
successful in realising changes of the first level, i.e., changes that concern the discourse 
of NPM. Also, important changes of the second level are realised: 75% of the Dutch 
municipalities apply output-oriented planning and control instruments (Moret, Ernst and 
Young 1997: 106-110) and a majority has a medium-term plan, an output budget, a 
hierarchical planning and control system, and performance reports (Van Helden/Ter 
Bogt 2001). However, in other respects second-level changes are limited: performance 
standards and instruments to audit outcomes are rare (Van Helden/Ter Bogt 2001; Ter 
Bogt/Van Helden 1999; Beukert 1998). Third level changes, as defined by Pollitt (2002) 
are limited. Changes in practices imply that the developed businesslike instruments are 
also actually embedded in daily managerial activities. This implies that politicians and 
managers also actually use the newly developed instruments, such as performance 
reports. However, on the basis of a survey Ter Bogt (2001) concluded that as a source of 
information these documents are of limited importance to the investigated aldermen. 
Also the case studies to be presented in this paper led to the conclusion that only a 
minority of responsible politicians and top managers thoroughly analyses the available 
performance information. Furthermore, performance-related pay and resignation of 
managers, based on explicit performance measures is rare (Weggemans/Koek 1999). 
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There is little evidence about changes at the fourth level, i.e., results. However, 
considerable results of NPM seem unlikely, if NPM affected management practices to 
only a limited extent. 
This paper investigates the relationship between decisions and practices. NPM is 
usually introduced in a discrete manner: new rules are set and, accordingly, the 
development of new instruments is initiated. The purpose of this paper is to explain the 
extent to which newly developed instruments are actually being used by investigating 
how well the information (resulting from the new instruments) fits the information 
needs of the users of this information. Thus, it seeks to explain the relation between 
decisions or rules on the one hand and practices or routines on the other. It does so by 
using case studies. The paper investigates the social services departments of three large 
Dutch municipalities. These three organisations have in common that they have adopted 
contract management, implying that they periodically release performance reports of 
some form to inform both its management and the responsible politicians.  
There are various aspects of systems for performance information that may explain 
information use. First, information load might influence the intensity of information use 
and the role of this information in the management control process. Information load is 
the amount of information that managers and politicians receive. Davenport and Beers 
(1995: 65), for instance, concluded that managers and process workers are very often 
confronted with too much information for it to be thoughtfully considered in the 
decision making process. Chewning and Harrell (1990: 527) found support for the 
hypothesis that individuals who experience overload exhibit a bell-shaped pattern of 
information usage. Therefore, this research takes information load into account in order 
to interpret differences in information use. Two aspects of information load are dealt 
with: perceived and actual information load. Perceived information load relates to the 
amount of information as perceived by its users: managers and politicians are asked 
whether, in their opinion, the amount of information included in performance reports is 
too small, adequate or too big. Actual information load is assessed by quantifying the 
amount of information by means of a measure developed for the purpose of this 
research. 
Second, the quality of performance information could influence the extent to which 
this information is used. Reliability of the data underlying the performance information 
and whether these data are up-to-date are relevant aspects of information quality. 
Furthermore, interpretation and analysis of performance figures might contribute to the 
quality of performance information, as perceived by its users. Finally, policy relevance 
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(i.e., whether the performance information provides insight into the implementation of 
the formulated policy) is another aspect of the quality of performance information. 
Third, the contents of performance reports may influence the extent to which these 
documents are actually used. Performance reports aim at satisfying information needs of 
politicians and managers. The extent to which these documents succeed in doing so, 
may contribute to the role they play in the management control processes of the 
organisation. Therefore, this paper investigates the match between the contents of 
performance reports on the one hand and the information needs of politicians and 
managers on the other. It highlights two aspects of the contents of information: the 
topics included and the level of aggregation these topics are dealt with. The topics 
concern aspects of performance on the primary processes, such as throughput time and 
unit costs (see table 1, section 3). Levels of aggregation relate to the extent of detail of 
the information, such as whether or not the information is specified for each separate 
organisational unit. 
Finally, organisation structure, information structure and applications of 
performance information are taken into account. Organisation structure relates to the 
division of tasks and responsibilities. Concerning organisation structure, Shick, 
Lawrence and Gordon (1990: 204) argued that the ability of an organisation to handle 
large amounts of information is mainly determined by its structure. Daft and Lengel 
(1986: 559) even concluded that an organisation’s structure can be tailor-made, such 
that managers receive an optimal amount of information. Information structure involves 
the dissemination and the application of performance information within organizations. 
Some organizations dispose of several reports with performance information, where 
each report is written for a different group of information users. Dissemination implies 
who receives which information. In the organization’s management processes reports 
can be applied for various purposes: planning, monitoring, evaluation and reward 
(Davenport and Beers 1995: 71; Birnberg and Snodgrass 1988: 447). Furthermore, 
Briers and Hirst (1990: 374) indicated that performance measurement can be a pressure 
device, a source of motivation and/or a means to identify problems and improvements. 
Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual framework of this paper. 
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This paper is structured as follows. Section 3 describes the cases in which the empirical 
research was conducted. It describes the tasks, the structures and the potential 
performance indicators of the selected organisations. Furthermore, it explains the 
selection of the organisations, the investigated documents and the interviewees. Section 
4 contains the case material and interpretations. First, it describes actual use of 
performance information by those who are most involved in the process. Subsequently, 
it seeks to explain differences in information use between the organisations and between 
individual incumbents. In doing so, this paper makes use of the concepts described 
above. Section 4.1 elaborates the influence of information load. Section 4.2 discusses 
the influence of the quality of information. Section 4.3 compares the contents of 
performance reports with the information needs of the interviewees and investigates 
how this relates to information use. Section 4.4 investigates information use in relation 
to the organisation structure, the information structure and the applications of the 
performance reports. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
Rules 
Routines 
= instruments to measure performance, developed on the initiative of politicians 
(section 4)
= management practices (4) 
Characteristics of performance 
information 
Organizational characteristics 
• Information load (section 4.1) 
• Quality of information (4.2) 
• Contents of performance reports (4.3) 
• Organization structure (section 4.4) 
• Information structure (4.4) 
• Application (4.4) 
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2. Case studies          
The most significant task of local social security departments in the Netherlands is to 
execute the General Social Security Act and related regulations.2 Although 
municipalities have a limited discretion to set their own policy, most of the regulations 
relevant to local social services departments are set by the central government. The 
implementation of the General Social Security Act provides payments to citizens who 
have no other means to cover the basic costs of living. These payments can be both 
regular, i.e., monthly, or one-off. Regular payments are meant for the normal costs of 
living. One-off payments or Supplementary Benefits are allocated to cover exceptional, 
but essential expenses, such as the purchase of a new washing machine or refrigerator. 
 Generally, the purposes of local social security departments are summarised in 
three keywords: income, care and labour. “Income” refers both to the allocation of 
benefits and monitoring the entitlements of clients to these benefits. “Care” implies 
looking for signs of poverty and, if necessary, helping clients to find solutions, such as 
applying for Supplementary Benefit. “Labour” relates to the coaching and the 
(re)qualifying of clients to participate in the regular labour market.  The 
implementation of the regulations and the performance of the tasks of social services 
departments are organised in six primary processes. First, registration is a primary 
process which concerns the initial contact between a client and the department. During 
the registration an employee of the social security department talks with the client and 
gathers some essential information. The social services department advises the client 
whether to apply for a social security payment and, if relevant refers them to other 
organisations. Second, the handling of applications is an important (and time-
consuming) primary process. It implies the gathering of information (for instance by 
checking the archive, interviewing the client and getting him to fill out several forms), 
the interpretation and analysis of the resulting information and making a decision 
concerning the benefits to be paid to the applicant. Third, for each individual client 
social services departments periodically (usually once a year) do a reinvestigation, a 
primary process comparable to the handling of an application, implying reassessing 
                                                           
2  Examples of other regulations implemented by local government are the Assistance 
Decree for the Self-employed, the Homes for the Elderly Act, the Income Benefits for 
the Elderly and Partly Disabled Formerly Self-employed Act and The Income Benefits 
for the Partly Disabled Unemployed Workers’ Act.  A detailed description of the 
regulations is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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entitlements of existing clients. Fourth, final investigations take place if a client is no 
longer entitled to receive benefits. This primary process results in termination of 
payments and (if the client has received too much) in claims on the client. Fifth, social 
services departments handle declarations of income. Every month, most beneficiaries 
have to fill out a form (the declaration of income) in which they indicate whether their 
relevant circumstances have changed. Sixth, for urgent reasons social services 
departments sometimes give an advance to individual beneficiaries. Concerning the 
execution of primary processes various elements of information can be included in 
performance reports. Table 1 describes information elements which offer insight into 
the work of social services departments. This information can be reported for each 
separate primary process.        
 This paper studies the use of the performance information indicated by table 1 in 
three large Dutch municipalities, i.e., Utrecht, Eindhoven and Groningen. Utrecht is 
located in the middle of the Netherlands and has approximately 235,000 inhabitants. 
Social Services are part of the Department of Welfare and had 15,984 clients at the time 
the interviews were held. Apart from Social Services the Department of Welfare also 
incorporates the Municipal Bank of Loans, Public Welfare and Labour Market Policy, 
Social Renewal and Target Groups. Social Services are divided in three districts. Each 
district is subdivided into 6 to 8 production sections, which execute the primary 
processes. Eindhoven, a city of the Southern part of the Netherlands, had 198,000 
inhabitants and a Social Services Department with 9,512 clients. The implementation of 
the primary processes is organised in four production sections. Finally, Groningen had 
169,000 inhabitants and a Social Services Department with 16,804 beneficiaries. The 
organisation structure of this department contains eight production sections which 
execute the primary processes. 
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Table 1: Topics in performance information for social services departments 
Topic Definition 
Volume the number of times/the frequency in which a primary process has 
been executed; i.e. the organisation's production 
Unit costs the average costs of executing a primary process 
Work in progress the number of files waiting to be handled, for instance the number of 
submitted applications which have not been handled yet 
Throughput time the time between the impulse to execute a primary process on a file 
and the time that this process has been executed 




the number of conversations with clients as part of primary processes 
Summons to clients the number of written requests to clients to turn up for an interview or 
to supply the municipality with information 
Response rate the percentage of clients which reacts on a request to supply 
information or to turn up for an interview 
Timeliness the percentage of primary processes which is executed on time, i.e. 
within the time constraints defined in the regulations 
 
Basically, there are three categories of incumbents who receive performance 
information. First, the production manager is in charge of all production sections. All 
the three cases have several production sections; each section has its own section 
manager. The organisation’s production manager is in charge of the section managers. 
The investigated organisations have in common that performance reports are not used 
below the level of the production manager. Second, the investigated departments have a 
category of managers (such as managing directors and controllers) who operate on the 
same or on a higher hierarchical level than the production manager and who are, 
compared to the production manager, indirectly accountable for the realised production. 
Third, the Municipal Executive is an important receiver of performance information. 
Each of the three organisations has several types of performance reports. Some reports 
aim at informing the Municipal Executive, others at informing managers at various 
hierarchical levels in the organisation. The municipalities have in common that they all 
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have a separate report to inform politicians. This paper investigates the use of 
performance reports by their users, i.e., all incumbents in the hierarchical line between 
the production manager and the relevant members of the Municipal Executive. 
Application of these criteria led to a selection of respondents as indicated in table 2. 
Table 2: Respondents/receivers of performance reports 
Respondent Utrecht Eindhoven Groningen 
Councillor of Social 
Services 
* * * 
Councillor of Finance * * * 
Managing director * * * 
Manager Social 
Services3 
* -- -- 
Controller * * * 
Production manager(s) **4 * * 
 
The empirical work in this paper is based on case studies and although not in the 
mainstream of accounting research, case studies have the potential to generate an 
understanding of the actual use of performance information in relation its organisational 
context (Covaleski/Dirsmith/Samuel 1996; Scapens 1990; Lee 1991). Investigating the 
practical use of performance information in the sphere of life being studied may 
contribute to explaining this use. However, the potential of case studies to generate 
generalisable conclusions, and the extent to which they offer an assurance of reliability 
and validity has often been criticised. In this research, several steps have been taken to 
warrant generalisability, reliability and validity.      
 As opposed to quantitative research, case studies do not rely on statistical 
                                                           
3  Utrecht is the only of the investigated municipalities which employs a manager Social 




generalisation. Case studies aim at theoretical or analytical generalisation and thus 
broaden the explanatory power of theory. This paper is based on the premise that 
general theoretical laws as such do not explain; specific circumstances of the case are 
essential in explaining the observed phenomena (Scapens 1990). Therefore, 
explanations in this paper are based on the combined use of relevant theories, specific 
circumstances of the individual cases and comparison of the three cases.  
 In order to support the reliability of the results, a case study protocol has been 
written. The case study protocol contains a detailed description of the field procedures, 
the data to be gathered and the questionnaires applied. In this respect, this project does 
not differ from quantitative research. However, it must be noticed that the unique 
combination and interaction between the respondent, the interviewer, the organisational 
context and the specific moment of the investigation inevitably affect the findings of the 
study.        
 Concerning validity case studies certainly have important strengths: they analyse 
micro-elements in their specific context. March, Sprouli and Tamuz (1991) explained 
this by using the metaphor of a portrait: various seemingly isolated characteristics 
cumulate to an underlying reality, like various elements of a portrait.    
 Furthermore, the interviewer wrote summaries of every interview taken and 
submitted these summaries to the respondents. Thus, the adequacy of the interviewer’s 
interpretation of the research data was verified, which should contribute to the validity 
of the findings. Furthermore, perceptions of various respondents were compared and 
checked for consistency. Finally, the summaries of the interviews constituted the raw 
material of this project and were included in the case study database, which was put 
together in order to support the study’s verifiability. 
 
4. Using performance information: case material and interpretations 
In preparing the research, periodic reports containing performance information were 
listed. First, each of the investigated social services departments compiled a 
management report to the Municipal Executive, usually covering a span of time of three 
to four months. Second, they all had a performance report on the departmental sections 
that execute the primary processes, which is meant to inform its managers and/or 
directors. Third, one of the three cases, i.e. Groningen, also produced reports for each 
                                                                                                                                                                           
4  At the time of the interviews, Utrecht employed two production managers (i.e., the 
managers of the districts). Eindhoven and Groningen employed only one production manager. 
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separate production section of the organisation. The last report informs the 
organisation’s central production manager on the performance of each production 
department. Each of the mentioned documents has its own group of users. In analysing 
the use of performance reports, this paper focuses on the use managers and politicians 
make of the reports specifically written for them. Table 3 summarises the extent to 
which the incumbents make use of this information. Information use is summarised on a 
five-point ordinal scale (does not read it - hardly uses it - use as a reference - reads it - 
thorough analysis). 
Table 3: The use of performance reports 





use as a reference 
 
use as a reference 
 













hardly uses it 
 






















1. thorough analysis 
2. thorough analysis 
 





In order to get an insight on the factors which influence the use of performance reports, 
these documents have been analysed and the receivers of these documents have been 
interviewed. Various aspects of the information and the organisation have been 
addressed.    
 The councillor of Finance in the municipality of Utrecht is the interviewee who 
makes the least use of performance information. Generally, he does not read this 
document. For his information concerning Social Services he relies heavily on civil 
servants that are employed by the central department of the municipal organisation. 
Basically, the councillor of Finance is only interested in developments with potential 
financial implications. The civil servants in the municipality’s central department 
monitor all the other departments for any developments which might imply financial 
risks. According to the councillor of Finance the management report to the Municipal 
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Executive is an inadequate instrument for timely observations of potential (financial) 
problems.   
 The production manager in Eindhoven and the managing directors in Utrecht and 
in Eindhoven hardly use the performance reports they receive. In executing his duties, 
the production manager in Eindhoven makes use of information gathered on an ad hoc 
basis. He regards the performance report he receives as too infrequent and inadequately 
related to his interests and responsibilities. Usually, he keeps a finger on the pulse by 
gathering weekly performance information. The managing directors in Utrecht and in 
Eindhoven both hardly use the performance reports they receive, because they are of the 
opinion that these documents are of an unsatisfactory quality in their municipalities. 
They argued that the performance reports mainly contained unanalysed and 
inconveniently arranged data.      
 The manager of Social Services in Utrecht does not thoroughly analyse 
performance reports, but does make the effort to take note of its contents. Sometimes, 
he uses this document as a guide and as source of information in discussions with other 
managers of the department and with the Municipal Executive. All the interviewed 
councillors of Social Services use the performance reports they receive as a reference. 
The opinions of these incumbents in the three investigated municipalities concerning the 
role of the management report to the Municipal Executive in the execution of their 
duties are comparable. This document is not an important source of information; it 
usually does not contain any information, which is new for them. Other sources of 
information are much more relevant. Periodic discussions with managers of the 
department are especially important in this respect.     
 The controller in Groningen reads the performance report written for the 
departments’ managers and focuses on the developments which may have financial 
consequences. However, he does not claim that he thoroughly analyses this document. 
Although he is a politician and not a manager, the councillor of Finance in Eindhoven 
uses the management report to the Municipal Executive in a comparable way: without 
thoroughly analysing it, he completely reads this document and focuses on 
developments which may have consequences in terms of finance, personnel and 
organisation.         
 The six remaining respondents, i.e. the production managers in Utrecht and in 
Groningen, the controller in Eindhoven and the managing director and councillor of 
Finance in Groningen claim to thoroughly analyse the performance reports they receive. 
In Utrecht, production managers evaluate the working of the primary processes with 
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their direct subordinates, every two weeks. For this evaluation, the performance reports 
are a very important topic for discussion and source of information. On this basis the 
direct subordinates of the production managers are called to account for the extent to 
which they have realised their targets. In Utrecht, performance reports for managers 
come out every week. The production manager of the municipality of Groningen makes 
use of performance reports in a comparable way to his colleagues in Utrecht. However, 
the frequency in which performance reports are released and the frequency of 
evaluations is lower and, on the other hand, more intensive. These reports usually cover 
a span of time of three months. After the release of the performance reports, the 
production manager holds individual, oral evaluations with each of his direct 
subordinates (i.e., the managers of the production sections). These discussions go 
deeper into the interpretation and explanation of the information and often result in 
agreements concerning the actions to be taken in order to cope with the organisation’s 
difficulties. The controller in Eindhoven also thoroughly analyses the performance 
report she receives. Sometimes, she even asks for additional information. The managing 
director in Groningen reads and analyses the performance documents and discusses 
their contents in the management team. Finally, the councillor of Finance in Groningen 
thoroughly analyses the performance report he receives, i.e. the management report to 
the Municipal Executive.        
 To sum up, managers and politicians differ considerably in the extent to which they 
make use of the performance information they receive. Generally, production managers 
and incumbents working for the municipality of Groningen use this information more 
intensively than the other interviewees. The literature suggests numerous circumstances 
that might influence the relevance of performance information. The following 
subsections of this paper seek to explain the differences in information use by 
addressing several aspects of the organisational context and of the performance 
information itself. 
 
4.1 Information load 
This paper addresses two dimensions of information load: perceived information load 
and actual information load. Perceived information load relates to the experience and 
perception of the users of performance information. All interviewees were asked how 
they judge the amount of performance information they periodically receive. Their 
opinions are summarised on a five-point, ordinal scale (much too small – too small – 
adequate – too big – much too big).     
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 Actual information load concerns the amount of performance information as 
measured by the researcher. The previous section of this paper described the primary 
processes of the investigated organisations and the topics concerning these primary 
processes that performance reports may include. Information load is expressed in 
information points, with one information point representing one topic concerning one 
information process. For instance, reporting the unit costs of a reinvestigation equals an 
information load of one information point. Reporting this topic for six primary 
processes, leads to a load of six points. Including four topics for one primary process 
leads to four information points. Apart from the number of topics and the number of 
primary processes included in the performance reports, the level of aggregation of the 
information included influences information load. Under some circumstances and for 
some information users it is useful to specify the information per production section or 
per executed regulation. Information load resulting from such a specification equals the 
information load for one (for example, organisational) unit multiplied by the number of 
units for which a specification is required. 







Cost per unit 
Registrations     
Handled 
applications 
    
Reinvestigations     
End 
investigations 
    
 
Table 4 is an imaginary example of performance information, which a periodic 
management report might contain. The information load of such a table equals 16 
information points. If a local social services department implements its primary 
processes via five producing sections or sub-departments, then a specification of the 
information for all these subsections requires 80 (5 times 16) information points.  
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Table 5 sets out both the perceived information load, and the actual load of the 
interviewed politicians and managers. Analysis of the information load to explain 
information use by politicians is unlikely to be worthwhile, as all the interviewed 
politicians, except one, agree that they receive too little performance information. 
Furthermore, they have in common that they hardly use the performance reports, which 
they receive. Only one of the interviewed politicians pays considerable attention to this 
document. Not only the perceived information, but also the actual information load of 
the politicians was limited, ranging from 0 information points in the municipality of 
Groningen to 8 information points in Eindhoven. A possible explanation for the limited 
use of performance reports by politicians is that the information contained in the report 
for the Municipal Executive is so poor that it is hardly worthwhile. 
The research material concerning the information load as perceived by managers is 
much more interesting. The interviewed managers demonstrate a considerable 
dispersion in their opinions and behaviours, both concerning the issue of information 
load, and the issue of information use. 
Table 5: Perceived and actual (in information points) information load 
Utrecht Eindhoven Groningen Respondent 
Perceived Actual Perceived Actual Perceived Actual 
Councillor of Social 
Services 
much too small 5 too small 8 Much too small 0 
Councillor of Finance no opinion 5 too small 8 Much too small 0 
Managing director Adequate 176 much too big 138 too big 13 
Manager Social 
Services 
too big 176 -- -- -- -- 
Controller no opinion 0 much too big 138 adequate 13 
Production 
manager(s) 
(1) too small 
(2) much too big 
176 too big 138 too big 1105 
                                                           
5  This respondent receives a separate performance report for each of the ten production sections. 
For this research, the performance report for one production section was analysed. The actual information 
load of this document equals 11 information points. 
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Noticeable is the fact that perceived information load does clearly not relate to actual 
information load. In the municipality with the largest actual information load, i.e. 
Utrecht, managers quite differently perceive this load. One of the production managers 
argues that the amount of information received is too small, whereas another expressed 
the opinion that his information load was much too big. The manager Social Services in 
the same municipality also judges that the information load is too big, whereas the 
Managing director argues that the information load is adequate. In Eindhoven, the actual 
information load of managers was smaller than in Groningen. However, in this 
municipality all the interviewed managers shared the view that the amount of reported 
performance information was either too big, or much too big. Unlike in Groningen, 
none of the managers interviewed in Eindhoven argued that the amount of performance 
information was too small or even adequate, although the actual information load was 
smaller. In Groningen, the information load of the interviewed managers differs: the 
production manager has an information load of 110 information points; the controller 
and the managing director have a (comparatively low) information load of 13 points. Of 
the investigated municipalities, managers in Groningen exhibit the lowest actual 
information load. Nevertheless, only one of the interviewees in this municipality 
perceived the information load as adequate; the others argued that the amount of 
information was too big. All in all, most interviewed managers argued that the 
information load was too big. However, the opinion that this load was adequate or too 
small was most widespread in the municipality with the highest actual information load. 
Thus, the relationship between perceived and actual information load is weak. 
Therefore, in explaining the observed differences in the practical use of performance 
information, both actual and perceived information load will be taken into account. 
 Table 6 relates the actual information load of managers to information use. 
Managers with a limited actual information load have in common that they differ little 
in their use of this information. Of the investigated municipalities, managers in 
Groningen both have the smallest actual information load, and are relatively intensive 
information users. In the organisation with the highest actual information load, i.e. 
Utrecht, managers differ considerably in the extent to which they make use of the 
reported information. Concerning actual information load, managers in Eindhoven are 
in an intermediate position: their load is higher than for their colleagues in Groningen 
and lower than in Utrecht. However, with the exception of the controller (as explained 
above), the managers interviewed in Eindhoven all extensively use the performance 
reports. In the municipality with the lowest actual information load the reports are used 
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intensively. In the two organisations with the higher information load, information use 
varies, especially in Utrecht. 
 
Table 6: actual information load and the use of performance information 
 The use of performance information 
Actual 
information 
load (in points) 
Hardly As a reference Read it Thorough analysis 
13    Controller - 
Groningen 
Managing director -  
Groningen 
110     Production manager – 
Groningen 
138 Managing director – 
Eindhoven 
Production manager – 
Eindhoven 
  Controller - Eindhoven 
176 Managing director – 
Utrecht 
Manager Social 
Services – Utrecht 
 Production manager 1 – 
Utrecht 
Production manager 2 – 
Utrecht 
 
As well as the actual information load, information use might also relate to perceived 
information load (see table 7). The situation in Eindhoven supports this assumption: all 
managers argued that they receive too much information and make use of this 
information to only a limited extent. However, in Utrecht both the perceived 
information load and the use of performance information differs, whereas a high 
perceived information load and information use do not seem to be related. In 
Groningen, finally, two of the three interviewed managers argued that they receive too 
much information. Nevertheless, information use in the latter municipality is 
comparatively intensive. Thus, perceived information load seems to be unrelated to 
information use. Managers who argued that they are supplied with too much 




Table 7: perceived information load and the use of performance information 




Hardly As a reference Reads it Thorough analysis 
Much too 
small 
    
Too small    Production manager 1 – 
Utrecht 
Adequate Managing director –  
Utrecht 
 Controller - 
Groningen 
 
Too big Production manager – 
Eindhoven 
Manager Social 
Services – Utrecht 
 Managing director -   
Groningen 




Managing director – 
Eindhoven 
  Controller –  
Eindhoven 
Production manager 2 – 
Utrecht 
 
To sum up, perceived information overload does not seem to lead to an extensive use of 
this information. The case studies do indicate that the actual information load relates to 
information use. The following sections of this paper will investigate further 
explanations for the use of performance information in the three organisations. 
 
 
4.2 The quality of information 
 
The vast majority of the interviewed politicians and managers is dissatisfied about the 
quality of the performance reports they receive. Only three respondents are of the 
opinion that these documents are of a satisfactory quality. These three interviewees have 
in common that they work for the municipality of Groningen. They are the councillor of 
Finance, the managing director and the controller of this municipality. 
There were various reasons for this dissatisfaction. In Utrecht, there was a lot of 
criticism on the registration of data underlying the reported performance information. 
The information system used in implementing the primary processes was unable to 
generate performance information. Therefore, performance reports were based on 
production lists filled out manually by the employees in the production sections. These 
data were not verified and the resulting reliability of performance information was 
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questionable. Another complaint often heard in the municipality of Utrecht was that the 
information included in performance reports is not up-to-date. 
The interviews led to the conclusion that the analysis and interpretation of data in 
performance reports are an important aspect of the quality of these documents. 
Generally, the incumbents interviewed in Utrecht and in Eindhoven were dissatisfied 
about the analysis and interpretation included in performance reports. Only the 
councillor of Finance in Utrecht was satisfied about the quality of the performance 
information he received concerning social services. However, different from the other 
interviewees, he did not make use of the performance documents compiled by the social 
services department. The councillor of Finance keeps informed via civil servants of the 
central staff of the municipal organisation. The central staff filters and analyses 
information concerning social services that may have financial implications. If 
necessary these civil servants inform the councillor of Finance, tailor made to his tasks 
and responsibilities. Therefore, this respondent does not use the documents compiled by 
social services, which are analysed in this paper. 
All the other respondents in Utrecht and in Eindhoven directly use the performance 
reports written by social services and have in common that they are dissatisfied about 
the quality of this information. The most important point of criticism is that these 
performance reports mainly contain tables and figures and little text or analysis. These 
documents fail to identify trends, new developments and potential difficulties. The 
figures included are unclear and need to be analysed and interpreted by the recipients. 
Performance reports for managers in Utrecht and in Eindhoven contain information for 
each separate production department. Both the manager of Social Services in Utrecht, 
and the managing director in Eindhoven are of the opinion that this information is much 
too detailed: the functioning of individual production departments is relevant for 
production managers; for them only insight into the performance of the organisation as 
a whole is relevant. 
In Groningen, politicians and managers are much more satisfied about the quality 
of the reported performance information. The councillor of Finance, the controller and 
the managing director in this municipality were satisfied. The production manager was 
satisfied as well, but he did express criticism concerning the extent to which 
performance reports offered insight into trends in the number of clients of the social 
services department and the backgrounds (such as rising unemployment figures) behind 
these trends. The councillor of Social Services expressed criticism about the explanation 
of figures included in the reports. 
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4.3 The contents of performance reports 
 
In addition to the amount and the quality of information, the contents of performance 
reports might also have an influence on the use of these documents. Performance reports 
are meant to satisfy the information needs of politicians and managers. Therefore, this 
research also attempted to measure these information needs. In measuring information 
needs, the central question was what politicians and managers actually want to know 
from the perspective of their tasks and responsibilities. 
To measure information needs, a method has been developed that contains several 
elements. Two concepts are essential: the concept of information points and the concept 
of information budgets. The information point is a unit that quantifies the amount of 
information (see section 3.1 of this paper). A characteristic of this method for measuring 
information needs is that users of performance information select the elements of 
information they want to receive in their periodic performance reports. The size of their 
selection is limited by their information budget. 
The method consists of three steps. First, the size of the information budget is 
determined. The size of the information budget is based on an evaluation of existing 
performance information. The information budget represents the amount of information 
a respondent is willing to handle and thus reflects his or her personal opinion 
concerning information load. The information budget is prepared by calculating the 
actual information load of a respondent (see section 3.1 for the produced results). Then, 
respondents are interviewed concerning their perceived information load. As also 
explained in section 3.1, the perceived load is expressed on a five-point ordinal scale. 
Eventually, the information budget is the result of relating the actual and the perceived 
information load. The information budget equals: 
 
b = e * i 
 
whereas b = the information budget; 
i = the number of information points of existing performance information; 
e = the factor which expresses the relation between b and i; this relation depends on the 
evaluation of the amount of existing performance information by the respondent. 
  
If a respondent evaluated the amount of performance information as  
much too small, b > 2*i 
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too small 1.25*i < b < 2*i 
adequate 0.875*i < b < 1.25*i 
too big 0.5*i < b < 0.875*i 
much too big b < 0.5*I 
 
Second, respondents indicated what they wanted to receive via periodic performance 
reports. The basic assumption is that performance information about primary processes 
relates to the topics explained in table 1. The interviewer presented an overview of these 
topics and asked the respondent to indicate about which topics he or she wanted to be 
informed. Furthermore, the level of aggregation of the selected information was a topic 
of discussion: the performance information could relate to the organisation as a whole 
or be specified, either per production section or per regulation. 
 Third, the interviewer calculates the actual information load resulting from the 
respondent’s selection. Then, the interviewer compares this information load with the 
respondent’s information budget: the maximum number of information points the 
respondent is “allowed” to select. If the selection of the respondent does not accord with 
the information budget, this is pointed out and the interviewee is asked to revise his 
selection. 
 Table 8 compares the information already available in performance reports with 
the expressed information needs. Column 2 of the table shows the number of topics 
included in the analysed documents (for a description of possible topics, see table 1). 
The subsequent columns identify respectively the number of topics omitted, the number 
of redundant topics and the number of discrepancies. Topics omitted are those topics 
which, to the opinion of the respondents, are omitted from the existing reports. 
Redundant topics are topics that the report includes, but are irrelevant to the opinion of 
the respondents. A discrepancy is a difference between the available information and 
the information needs, expressed by the interviewees. The number of discrepancies is 





Table 8: differences between existing performance information and information needs 









Municipality of Utrecht     
Councillor of Social 
Services 
1 2 0 2 
Councillor of Finance6 - - - - 
Managing director 2 3 0 3 
Manager Social Services 2 2 0 2 
Controller 2 3 0 3 
Production manager 1 2 3 0 3 
Production manager 2 2 3 0 3 
Municipality of 
Eindhoven 
    
Councillor of Social 
Services 
4 2 0 2 
Councillor of Finance 4 1 1 2 
Managing director 4 1 2 3 
Controller 4 0 0 0 
Production manager 4 1 0 1 
Municipality of 
Groningen 
    
Councillor of Social 
Services 
0 5 0 5 
Councillor of Finance 0 5 0 5 
Managing director 4 2 2 4 
Controller 4 0 2 2 
Production manager 6 1 1 2 
 
Differences between the contents of available information on the one hand, and 
information needs on the other, provide hardly any clues to explain the use of 
performance reports. Incumbents of the municipality of Groningen, as well as the 
production managers of the municipality of Utrecht work intensively with the 
performance reports they receive. 
 However, the information provision to politicians concerning primary processes of 
the municipality of Groningen is very poor. Contrary to the two other municipalities, 
                                                           
6  The councillor of Finance in the municipality of Utrecht was not prepared to answer the 
questions related to the contents of this table. In his opinion these questions were irrelevant, 
because (as described earlier in this paper) civil servants of the central staff in the municipal 
organisation were responsible for selecting information and signalling developments that might 
be relevant for the councillor of Finance. The respondent said to be unable to make an adequate 
selection of information concerning primary processes of Social Services, which might be 
relevant from the perspective of his tasks and responsibilities. 
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performance reports for politicians in Groningen do not contain any information that 
relates to the functioning of these processes. Nevertheless, the intensity of the 
information use by the councillor of Social Services in Groningen does not considerably 
differ from his counterparts in the other two municipalities. The councillor of Finance in 
Groningen uses the performance report for the Municipal Executive even more 
intensively than the councillors of Finance in Utrecht and in Eindhoven. In the 
information provision to the Municipal Executive, Groningen both has the highest 
number of topics omitted, and the highest number of discrepancies. Thus, the contents 
of performance reports hardly seems to influence the use politicians make of these 
documents. 
 For managers, the relation between the topics included in performance reports on 
the one hand, and their information needs on the other is rather weak as well. In 
Eindhoven, the performance report available for managers omitted few topics that 
managers want to be informed about. The number of redundant topics is limited as well: 
only the managing director argued that he received information on irrelevant topics. 
Despite the good match between the topics included in the performance reports and the 
observed information needs, these documents were used to only a limited extent. On the 
contrary, in Groningen the interviewed managers intensively use the performance 
information provided. The number of topics omitted from the available reports is 
limited and comparable to the situation in Eindhoven. However, the number of 
redundant topics is larger than in Eindhoven. The interview data gathered in Utrecht 
support the conclusion that the contents of performance reports have little influence on 
their use. The documents available in Utrecht do not contain redundant topics, but do 
omit many important themes. The number of topics included in the performance reports 
is just half or even less than the number of topics the interviewed managers want to be 
informed about. In this respect the interviewed managers were unanimous in their 
opinions. Remarkable in this respect is that managers in Utrecht differ considerably in 
the extent to which they use the information: contrary to the other interviewed 
managers, production managers are intensive users of performance reports. In 
Eindhoven the match between the contents of the available information on the one hand 
and the registered information needs on the other is much stronger than in Utrecht, 
whereas the managers in Utrecht make more elaborate use of the information. 
 The level of aggregation of information supplied is also an important aspect of the 
information needs of the respondents. Performance information in the investigated 
organisations can be specified per production section or per implemented regulation. 
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None of the investigated documents contained a specification of information per 
regulation. Managers in Groningen did not want such a specification. However, in 
Utrecht and in Eindhoven the desire to receive performance information specified per 
regulation was widespread: out of all the managers in these two municipalities, there 
was only one respondent who did not want such a specification. Concerning the 
specification of performance information per production section the contents of the 
available performance information and information needs match very well. In Utrecht 
all the interviewed managers want and actually do receive performance information 
specified per production section. In Groningen, only the production manager wants to 
receive information concerning the performance of separate production sections. He is 
the only manager in this organisation who also actually receives this (rather detailed) 
information, whereas the other interviewed managers just receive information about the 
organisation as a whole. In Eindhoven, all managers receive information specified for 
the separate production sections, but the production manager is the only one with 
information needs with this level of detail; the other managers are only interested in 
information about the organisation as a whole. Notable is the fact that in the 
municipality where the difference in aggregation level of existing information and 
information needs is the largest (i.e., Eindhoven), the information use is the least.  
 The match between the topics included in performance reports and information 
needs have little influence on information use. However, the match between the level of 
aggregation of available performance information of information needs is correlated 
with information use. 
 
 
4.4 Organization structure, information structure and applications 
 
An organisation’s capacity to handle information may be related to its organisational 
structure. Shick, Lawrence and Gordon (1990: 204) argued that the ability of an 
organisation to handle large amounts of information is mainly determined by its 
structure. Daft and Lengel (1986: 559) even concluded that an organisation’s structure 
can be tailor-made, such that managers receive an optimal (or manageable) amount of 
information. Decentralisation implies the devolution of tasks and responsibilities to 
lower hierarchical levels and, relevant for of this paper, the handling of related 
performance information at that level. 
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 The organisation structures of the three investigated departments, however, do not 
explain the differences in information use. Utrecht clearly has the most decentralised 
organisation structure. In Eindhoven and Groningen, the production manager is under 
direct supervision of the managing director. In Utrecht, the number of hierarchical 
levels between the managing director and the production managers is greater. First, 
Social Services in Utrecht is not an independent department; it is part of the department 
of Welfare. The manager of Social Services is formally under the supervision of the 
managing director. The production managers are under the direct supervision of the 
manager of Social Services. Thus, Utrecht has one more hierarchical layer than the two 
other municipalities. Second, Utrecht has two production managers (instead of one, as is 
the case in Eindhoven and in Groningen) and a third position for a production manager 
was vacant at the time of the interviews. For the organisation as a whole, the extra 
hierarchical layer and the splitting of production management in two results in an ability 
to process a comparatively large amount of information and / or to limit the information 
load of individual incumbents. However, the information load of individual managers in 
the municipality of Utrecht is bigger than in the two other organisations. In Utrecht, the 
information load of managers equals 176 information points, whereas elsewhere this 
load amounts 13 points (controller and managing director in Groningen), 110 points 
(production manager in Groningen) and 138 points (all interviewed managers in 
Eindhoven). In these cases decentralisation neither results in a reduced information 
load, nor in more intensive use of information. 
 Amat et al (1994: 120) suggested that the span of control (that is the number of 
employees under the direct charge of a manager) influences the role of management 
accounting systems in organisations. Managers with a small span of control are able to 
interfere more directly in the organisational units they are responsible for and might 
thus use performance information more intensively. The span of control of production 
managers in the three municipalities differs considerably: in Groningen the span of 
control of the production manager is ten, in Utrecht six to eight and in Eindhoven four. 
Notable is the fact that performance information is used most intensively in the 
municipality with the highest span of control (i.e., Groningen). 
 Generally in these three cases, organisation structure seems to have little influence 
on the use of systems for performance measurement in practice. Also additional 
hierarchical layers, the splitting up of positions and differences in span of control hardly 
seem to influence the extent to which managers use information about performance. 
However, information structure might also influence the relevance and use of 
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information. Information structure refers to the roles of the individuals specifically 
involved in writing, receiving and evaluating performance information and the relations 
between these roles. 
 The information structure in Groningen clearly differs from the information 
structure in the two other municipalities. In Utrecht and Eindhoven, all the interviewed 
managers (production managers, controllers and managing directors) receive exactly the 
same performance information. In Groningen, however, there is differentiation in the 
information provided to managers: the production manager receives different 
performance reports than the controller and the managing director. This organisation has 
performance reports on each of the separate production sections. Furthermore, there is 
also a periodic performance report for the organisation as a whole, which does not 
include information on separate organisational sections. The latter report aims primarily 
at informing the controller and the managing director, whereas the former aims to 
inform the production manager. This way of differentiating in the information provision 
offers the possibility to tailor-make documents to the tasks and responsibilities of the 
manager concerned and to better utilise the information processing capacity of the 
organisation. Hierarchically, the production manager is in direct charge of the 
production sections and from this perspective he receives other information than the 
controller and the managing director. Differentiation leads to tailor-made and thereby to 
more potentially useful information. 
 This paper has already concluded that the level of aggregation of the available 
information matches the information needs of managers in Groningen. Differentiation in 
information provision makes it easier to realise such a match. Furthermore, the reports 
investigated in this municipality deal with most of the topics about which managers 
want to be informed. Nevertheless, performance reports for managers in Groningen also 
contain redundant topics. In Eindhoven the aggregation level of information included in 
performance reports differs from the aggregation level of their information needs. In 
Utrecht, many topics that are important, in the opinion of the interviewed managers, are 
missing. Differentiation in information provision seems to relate to a more intensive use 
of performance reports and a better match between the contents of these reports and 
information needs. However, it does not lead to the deletion of redundant topics. 
 In addition to the issue of differentiation, there are also clear differences between 
the municipalities in the processes which lead to the production of performance reports. 
In all three municipalities performance reports for the Municipal Executive are 
structured according to a pre-set standard. The departments concerned receive 
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instructions about the topics that performance reports should deal with. In Utrecht and 
in Eindhoven, the same goes for information for managers: the primary processes and 
the topics to be included in performance reports is prescribed by a standard structure. 
The reports in these two municipalities mainly contain “raw” figures. 
In Groningen, the production of these documents takes place in another way. The 
section managers write performance reports on their separate sections; these are the 
documents with the lowest level of aggregation. They aim at accounting for the 
performance of the separate sections under the control of the production manager. The 
production manager sets guidelines concerning the topics to be included in these 
reports, but the topics are not fixed, and may change each period. Furthermore, the 
documents have to indicate developments with possible financial implications, and 
contain an analysis of the difficulties identified and possible solutions. Thus, there is no 
rigid pre-set structure for these reports: the contents depend on recent developments and 
difficulties in the organisation. The individual managers are directly involved in and 
accountable for their production section. 
 Davenport and Beers (1995: 71) argued that performance information requires a 
context or management process. Systems for performance measurement can fulfil 
several roles in organisations. Ansari and Euske (1987: 556) identified three functions 
of these systems. First, such a system can generate information to support the efficient 
allocation of resources. Second, it might influence the perceptions and behaviour of 
participants in the organisation. Third, it may be used to secure legitimacy of the 
external constituencies. Birnberg and Snodgrass (1988: 447) identified various 
subsystems related to performance measurement, i.e., planning, monitoring, evaluation 
and reward. Briers and Hirst (1990: 374) defined several roles of performance 
measurement, such as pressure device, source of motivation, a means to identify 
problems and a point of departure for implementing improvements. All authors referred 
to in this paragraph have in common that they emphasise the management processes in 
which the systems of performance measurement are embedded. 
 Concerning the management processes in the three municipalities, the interviewed 
incumbents strongly differ. In Eindhoven, there is hardly any structured management 
process to deal with performance information. There is no clearly structured procedure 
for evaluating and discussing performance reports. With the exception (explained earlier 




 Production managers in Utrecht intensively use the performance reports they 
receive. These reports are released every week. Every two weeks, the production 
managers discuss the realised performance with the managers of the production 
sections. During these discussions performance information has a clear role: 
interventions needed to correct difficulties are agreed. Performance reports are thus an 
important source of information, and they play a role in monitoring and evaluating the 
functioning of these departments (Birnberg / Snodgrass 1988: 447), and signalling 
necessary intervention (Briers / Hirst 1990: 374). Although less frequently and less 
structured, the manager Social Services works with this information in a comparable 
manner. However, he only does this if there are serious reasons to do so. The managing 
director and the controller do not use performance reports within the context of such a 
structured and clearly defined management process. 
 In Groningen, performance reports play a clearly defined role. Performance reports 
for the separate production sections are the basis of periodic discussions in which the 
production manager assesses the performance of each production section with its 
manager. The questions asked during these discussions are similar to the instructions set 
by the production manager regarding the contents of the performance reports, the extent 
to which the targets have been realised. Furthermore, these meetings  look back at the 
interventions which were agreed to solve difficulties in earlier periods. On the basis of 
these meetings and reports future management interventions and actions are agreed. 
Furthermore, targets for the coming months are set. 
 The production manager, in his turn, writes a performance report which 
summarises the joint production of the individual sections, and discusses it with the 
department’s management team, consisting of the production manager, the controller 
and the managing director. Compared to his counterparts in the two other 
municipalities, the managing director uses this performance report quite extensively, 
whereas the controller only scans the report for developments that may have financial 
implications. 
 In Groningen, performance reports play a role in mobilising support for change: by 
requiring managers to write their own performance reports and then having a dialogue 
with them concerning their performance, commitment can be created (Ansari / Euske 
1987: 556). Furthermore, these documents play a role in planning, monitoring and 
evaluation of production (Birnberg / Snodgrass 1988: 447). Also the functions of 
performance measurement described by Briers and Hirst (1990: 374) can partly be 
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recognised. Performance measurement in this organisation functions as a way of 





With the introduction of contract management, performance measurement has become 
an important theme in controlling municipal organisations. Contract management is a 
form of New Public Management, a businesslike control style that is adopted by many 
governmental organisations in various countries. The adoption of contract management, 
usually initiated by the politicians at the top of the organization, result in a discrete 
introduction of new accounting rules. These rules concern two new accounting 
instruments, i.e. the management contract and the management report. In both 
instruments performance information plays a crucial role. This paper investigated the 
relation between the new instruments on the one hand and the routines of politicians and 
managers on the other hand. More specifically, it investigated how routines, i.e. 
information use, of managers and politicians can be explained by the characteristics of 
the newly set rules or instruments.  
 Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) and Pollitt (2002) distinguished four levels of NPM 
change, ranging form abstract to specific. This paper mainly addressed two of these 
levels, i.e., “decision” and “practices”. This paper investigated “decisions” by the 
organization’s top management to adopt businesslike instruments that generate 
performance information. “Practices” concern the activities of work floor management 
in the regular control of the organization’s primary processes. This paper challenges the 
hypothesis that the levels of NPM change are related in a hierarchical manner, i.e., that 
change at a higher level is a requirement for lower level changes. 
 This paper gives ground to the conclusion that the characteristics of instruments 
that are developed in accordance with the rules set by the organisation’s politicians and 
top managers, only have a limited influence on the practices or routines of work floor 
managers. The strongest influence on the use of performance information is the 
availability of a structured management process to handle this information, rather than 
the characteristics of the imposed instrument to generate this information or the 
characteristics of this information (Davenport / Beers 1995: 71; Ansari / Euske 1987: 
556; Birnberg / Snodgrass 1988: 447; Briers / Hirst 1990: 374). The extent to which 
performance reports are embedded in the organisation’s management processes is the 
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most important factor in explaining the actual use of these documents. Respondents who 
intensively use these reports have in common that these documents are embedded in 
their control activities. Intensively used performance reports are embedded in the 
planning, the monitoring, the periodical evaluation, the identification of difficulties and 
the realisation of improvements. The clarity of the organisational context of 
performance reports is the most important explanatory variable for the actual use of 
these documents and also limits information load.  
 The organisation’s information structure considerably influences information use. 
Information structure relates to the incumbents involved in writing, receiving and 
evaluating performance information and the relations between these persons. 
Decentralisation in the information provision by means of differentiation (i.e., 
compiling separate performance reports for various kinds of managers) has a clear 
positive influence. Differentiation enables performance reports tailor-made to the 
information needed by the managers. Imposing the organisation a standard structure for 
the contents of performance reports has a negative influence on the extent they are 
actually used. Revising the contents to focus on the current difficulties of the 
organisation can result in greater use. Setting detailed rules concerning the contents of 
performance reports does apparently not have a positive influence on the use of 
performance information in the routines of the organization. 
 Various authors stressed the importance of information load for the actual use of 
performance reports (see for instance Davenport / Beers 1995: 65; Chewning / Harrell 
1990: 527). This paper focussed on two aspects of information load: the actual 
information load and the information load as perceived by its users. The relation 
between the actual and the perceived information load turned out to be very weak. 
Actual information load seems to relate to information use. In the organisation with the 
lowest actual information load, politicians and managers use the performance reports 
relatively intensive. However, analysis of the relation between actual information load 
and information load in the two other organisations does not lead to clear conclusions. 
The perceived information load and information use, hardly relate. 
 Furthermore, the relation between information use and the quality of information is 
investigated. Respondents who are satisfied about the quality of the information have in 
common that they all work for the organisation with the most intensive information use. 
All respondents in the other two organisations are dissatisfied about quality. 
 In investigating the influence of the contents of performance reports, the 
information needs of the respondents are registered and compared with the contents of 
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the available documents. Two aspects of the contents of performance documents have 
been taken into account: the included topics and the level of aggregation of the 
information. The extent to which the topics included match with information needs 
seems to have little influence on information use. However, the match between the level 
of aggregation of information needs and of the information included in performance 
reports does relate with information use.  
 Apart from the characteristics of performance information described above, the 
influence of organizational characteristics has been addressed. Organisation structure 
and especially decentralisation on the hand and the handling of information by the 
organisation on the other are hypothesised to relate (Shick et al 1990: 204; Daft / Lengel 
1986: 559). However, in the case studies there are no indications that decentralisation of 
the organisation structure leads to a more intensive use of information.  
 The development of NPM practices only partly depends on NPM decisions. This 
paper investigated performance measurement as an important aspect of NPM decisions 
and the use of the resulting information as an aspect of NPM practices. New 
management practices may also develop, if the decisions taken at a higher hierarchical 
level in the organization inadequately fit with the tasks of work floor management. 
 The levels of NPM change (i.e., discourse, decision, practices and results) only 
partly relate in a hierarchical manner: NPM change at a lower level does not necessarily 
require a good fit with higher level changes. Active use of performance information can 
only be partly explained by the contents of this information, i.e., the characteristics of 
the used instruments. All in all, NPM change implies both top-down and bottom-up 
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